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INDIANA'S MALPRACTICE SYSTEM:
NO-FAULT BY ACCIDENT?
ELEANOR D. KINNEY* AND WILLIAM P. GRONFEIN**
I
INTRODUCTION
This article reviews Indiana's ten years of experience with medical
malpractice tort and insurance reforms. Indiana's malpractice reforms were
among the first comprehensive malpractice reforms in the nation, have
withstood several constitutional challenges, and have undergone few major
changes since 1975.' A model for other states2 and the federal government,3
these reforms have helped Indiana health care providers continue to enjoy
low malpractice premiums compared to other states. 4 Both health care
providers and insurers are highly satisfied with the system.5 Recently,
however, press reports have galvanized consumer concerns about whether the
reforms promote the interests of providers and insurers over those of
claimants. 6
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1. See Cha v Warnick, 476 NE2d 109, 114 (Ind 1985); Rohrabaugh v Wagoner, 274 Ind 661, 664-
68, 413 NE2d 891, 894-95 (1980);Johnson v St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind 374, 386-408, 404 NE2d
585, 591-606 (1980); Whitaker v St. Joseph's Hosp., 415 NE2d 737, 745-46 (Ind App 1981); Lee v
Lafayette Home Hsp., Inc., 410 NE2d 1319, 1320-21 (Ind App 1980). Contrast Hines v Elkhart General
Hasp., 465 F Supp 421, 431-34 (ND Ind 1979), aff'd, 603 F2d 646 (7th Cir 1979).
2. See, for example, Kan Stat Ann §§ 60.3407, 65.4901 (Kan Dep't Admin, 1985 & 1989
Supp); La Rev Stat Ann § 40.1299.49 (West, 1977 & 1990 Supp); Neb Rev Stat §§ 2801-2855 (West,
1988); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary
Report Card, 22 UC Davis L Rev 499, 521-31 (1989).
3. See generally Dept of Health & Human Services, Description of Model Health Care Provider
Liability Reform Act (December 1987); Dept of Health & Human Services, Report of the Task Force
on Medical Liability and Malpractice (August 1987).
4. See notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
5. See US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Case Study on Indiana 2 (December 1986)
("GAO, Case Study on Indiana").
6. See Joseph T. Hallinan & Susan M. Headden, A Case of Neglect: Medical Malpractice in Indiana,
Indianapolis Star 1 (June 24, 1990); Joseph T. Hallinan & Susan M. Headden, State Failing to Crack
Down on Malpractice, Indianapolis Star 1 (June 25, 1990); Joseph T. Hallinan & Susan M. Headden,
Malpractice Laws Stacked Against Victims: Doctors, Insurance Companies Reap Biggest Benefits, Indianapolis
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
This article analyzes the history and operation of the reforms, focusing on
Indiana's Patient Compensation Fund ("PCF") and the comprehensive cap
on all damages. The PCF and its cap on damages are among the most
substantial legal changes of any state's, 7 and have the greatest impact on the
most seriously injured claimants. Part II describes Indiana's Medical
Malpractice Act ("the Act"), 8 and analyzes its practical application. Part III
compares Indiana's experiences under the Act with neighboring states'
experiences and with national data on malpractice claims, claimants, and
defendants. As shown by the data, the unique characteristics of the Act and its
implementation have led to quite generous payment of large claims with
surprisingly little consideration of the defendants' fault. These results
suggest that Indiana may have implemented, quite accidentally, a
compensation system for large medical malpractice claims containing many
key characteristics of no-fault compensation systems. 9
II
THE INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
A. Background
Indiana is a conservative jurisdiction whose statutory and case law in the
tort law field favors defendants.' 0 The state has a modified comparative fault
statute (although medical malpractice claims are exempted) that, unlike pure
comparative fault statutes, adopts the more conservative approach allowing
recovery only when the defendant's fault exceeds the plaintiff's."
Additionally, in 1986, Indiana modified the common law collateral source
rule, making evidence of other sources of compensation for the plaintiff's
injury admissible at trial. 12 Finally, Indiana's wrongful death statute, unlike
the more generous statutes of some other states, precludes recovery for
emotional loss even for the death of children.' 3 It is not surprising then that
Star 1 (June 26, 1990). See also Isabel Wilkerson, As Indiana Debates its Malpractice Law, So Does the
Country, NY Times (National) All (August 20, 1990).
7. See Bovbjerg, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 525 (cited in note 2).
8. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5 (Bums, 1990).
9. See notes 157-71 and accompanying text.
10. See John F. Vargo, 1983 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law: Torts, 17 Ind L Rev 341,
385 (1984); Robert G. Ziegler, 1984 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law: Torts, 18 Ind L Rev
417, 425-27 (1985).
11. Ind Code Ann § 34-4-33-4 (1986); L. Larson, 1 Comparative Negligence: Law and Practice
§ 2.30 (Matthew Bender, 1990); see Lawrence P. Wilkins, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act at First
(Lingering) Glance, 17 Ind L Rev 687 (1984); Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence in Indiana: A
Unique Statute that Will Reshape the Law, 17 Ind L Rev 957, 963-64 (1984).
12. Act of March 11, 1986, Pub L No 201-1986, 1986 Ind Acts 1969, codified at Ind Code Ann
§§ 34-4-36-1 to 3 (Burns, 1988). See generally Lawrence P. Wilkins, A Multi-Perspective Critique of
Indiana's Legislative Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule, 20 Ind L Rev 399 (1987).
13. Ind Code Ann §§ 34-1-1-1 to 2 (1990); see Stuart M. Speiser, 1 Recoveryfor Wrongful Death
§ 1:12-14 at 32-38 (Lawyers Co-Op, 2d ed 1975).
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Indiana has adopted, and its courts have upheld, what are arguably the
nation's strictest set of tort and insurance reforms for medical malpractice.' 4
In the early 1970s, Indiana, along with the rest of the nation, experienced
a crisis in the cost and availability of medical malpractice insurance for its
health care providers. 15  Indiana, like other states, experienced sharp
increases in the size and frequency of medical malpractice claims.' 6
Consequently, the availability of medical malpractice insurance for physicians
and hospitals decreased sharply in the mid-1970s.' 7  In January 1975,
Governor Otis R. Bowen, himself a physician, called in his State of the State
address for reform of the common law tort system for medical malpractice.'S
On February 4, 1975, House Bill 1460 ("H 1460"), drafted by attorneys
for the Indiana State Medical Association, was introduced into the Indiana
House of Representatives.' 9 H 1460 called for an independent administrative
tribunal, composed of physicians, lawyers, and consumers, to adjudicate
malpractice claims and award damages and attorneys' fees according to fixed
schedules and formulas.2 0 When it became clear that most Indiana senators
opposed the bill as too radical a departure from the common law jury system,
the Indiana Senate considered a flurry of amendments that introduced
elements of the current Act. Throughout, the legislature deliberated in an
atmosphere of crisis. Physicians packed the galleries as the legislators
debated. As one attorney recalls, "The entire House chamber was full of
doctors-yelling, screaming .... [Ilt was the damnedest thing you've ever
seen."
2 1
14. See Frank A. Sloan & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice: Crisis, Response and Effects,
Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull 13 (May 1989).
15. See generally Otis R. Bowen, Medical Malpractice Law in Indiana, I IJ Legis 15 (1984). See
also Adam Benjamin, Jr., Indiana's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in David Warren & Richard Merritt, eds,
A Legislator's Guide to the Medical Malpractice Issue 38 (Health Policy Center, Graduate School,
Georgetown University, and National Conference of State Legislatures, 1976).
16. The frequency of claims filed against physicians between 1970 and 1975 increased 42%, and
the average damage award increased from $12,993 in 1970 to $34,297 in 1975, with medical
malpractice insurance premiums for physicians rising 410% during the same period. Indiana
Medical Malpractice Study Commission, Final Report 5-6 (1976) ("IMMSC Final Report").
17. See Mansur v Carpenter, No 37281, slip op 4 (Hancock County Cir Ct, April 6, 1978); IMMSC
Final Report at 5-6 (cited in note 16).
In the summer of 1974, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company advised nearly 1,000
Indiana physicians that it would not renew their malpractice insurance. The Medical Protective
Company, Indiana's major malpractice insurer for physicians, sharply limited the amount of
insurance it would write for individual physicians. Similarly, in 1974 and early 1975, the seven major
malpractice insurers for hospitals discontinued or limited writing liability insurance for hospitals. In
response, many Indiana hospitals curtailed emergency and surgery services because of the high cost
of liability insurance or lack of insured physicians to staff these services. Mansur, No 37281 at 4.
18. Message of Governor Otis R. Bowen to the 99th General Assembly, First Session,Journal of
the House 31-36 (January 9, 1975). See also Benjamin, Indiana's Medical Malpractice Crisis at 38 (cited in
note 15); Bowen, 11 J Legis at 15 (cited in note 15).
19. See Benjamin, Indiana's Medical Malpractice Crisis at 39 (cited in note 15).
20. Id at 39-40.
21. Hallinan & Headden, June 26, 1990 Indianapolis Star at 8 (cited in note 6).
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This activity culminated on April 17, 1975, when the Indiana General
Assembly enacted the Act.2 2 The Act's purpose was to provide health care
professionals and institutions with affordable medical malpractice insurance
and thus assure the continued availability of health care services in the state. 23
Shortly after the Act was passed, medical malpractice premiums in Indiana
dropped, and insurance became readily obtainable again. 24
B. The Act's Provisions
The Act contains three major reforms: (1) a comprehensive cap on
damages, (2) mandated medical review before trial, and (3) a state-run
insurance fund to pay large claims (the PCF). Through 1989, the cap on
medical malpractice recoveries was $500,000.25 The legislature raised the cap
to $750,000 for claims occurring after January 1, 1990, presumably in
recognition of a need to address inequities in the system for persons with
large claims.26
Eligible health care providers, exhaustively defined in the statute,2 7
participate voluntarily by proving "financial responsibility." In this context,
financial responsibility means a specified level of primary malpractice
insurance coverage. Health care providers also participate by paying a
surcharge on their primary insurance coverage to finance the PCF.28 The
level of primary insurance coverage for physicians and other health care
providers is $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 total.2 9 Nearly all Indiana
physicians and about 90 percent of Indiana hospitals participate. 30
Nonparticipants are protected neither by the damage cap nor by the PCF.3 l
22. Act of April 17, 1975, Pub L No 146-1975, 1975 Ind Acts 854, codified as amended at Ind
Code § 16-9.5 (1990).
23. Report of the Committee on Labor and the Economy to the 99th General Assembly, First
Session,Journal of the House 577-78 (March 5, 1975). See Bowen, 1IJ Legis at 15 (cited in note 15);
Benjamin, Indiana's Medical Malpractice Crisis at 39-40 (cited in note 15);Johnson, 273 Ind at 379-80,
404 NE2d at 589-90; Mansur, No 37281 at 6-7.
24. GAO, Case Study on Indiana at 2 (cited in note 5); Michael S. Mullen, Update on the Indiana Law
of Medical Malpractice, in Indiana Medical Malpractice S-13 to S-14 (Medical Protective Co., Fort Wayne,
1984) (materials prepared for Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum) ("Update").
25. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-2-2(b)-(c).
26. Act of May 2, 1989, Pub L No 189-1989 § 1, 1989 Ind Acts 1538, codified as amended at Ind
Code Ann § 16-9.5-2-2. The Indiana State Medical Association, the Indiana Hospital Association,
and the Indiana Trial Lawyers Association entered an agreement, subsequently communicated to the
legislative leadership by memorandum on March 1, 1989, to support this increase in the cap and not
to support a legislatively mandated study of the Act until after January 1, 1993. Memorandum to
Michael K. Phillips, Paul S. Mannweiler, Robert D. Garton, and Dennis P. Neary.
27. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-1-1.
28. Id at § 16-9.5-2-1(a).
29. Id at § 16-9.5-2-6(a). As of 1985, small hospitals (fewer than 100 beds) must carry $2
million in annual aggregate insurance, larger hospitals must carry $3 million, and prepaid health care
delivery plans must carry $700,000. Act of April 14, 1985, Pub L No 177-1985, § 3, 1985 Ind Acts
1391, codified at Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-2-6.
30. Telephone interview between Julie Ann Randolph, assistant director, Center for Law and
Health, and Dianna J. Pitcher, manager, Medical Malpractice Division, Indiana Department of
Insurance (September 18, 1990).
31. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-1-5.
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1. The Medical Review Panel. The Act specifies that malpractice claimants
must file their claims with the Indiana Department of Insurance and go
through a medical review panel before proceeding to trial.32 As of 1985,
however, claimants can opt out and proceed directly to court if all parties
agree to forgo panel review.33 Also as of 1985, claimants with claims under
$15,000 can unilaterally opt out.3 4 At any point, the parties may settle the
claim. Further, the PCF may consider and pay the claim without a medical
review panel opinion.3 5
For the remaining claimants, the medical review panel provides an
informal process to encourage an early decision on liability and can thereby
facilitate quick resolution of the claim.3 6 The panel consists of one attorney,
who serves as nonvoting chair, and three health care providers.3 7 The parties
select the attorney who will serve as chair.38 Each party selects one provider
panelist, and those two provider panelists select the third.39 Each party may
challenge the third panelist without the need to show cause.40 When
requested, providers must serve on medical review panels except in cases of
serious hardship. 41 The panel review process is designed to take less than
nine months. 42
The panel is authorized solely to give expert opinion on the cause of the
injury and on the defendant's liability, or to determine that a material issue of
fact bears on liability.43 The panel has no role in determining damages,
unlike its counterpart in some other states. 44 The panel receives evidence and
reviews the discovery made by the parties, and can also consult independent
medical authorities. 45 The panel's opinion is admissible at trial, but is not
conclusive evidence of causation or liability; either party can compel any panel
member to testify at trial at that party's expense. 46
32. Id at §§ 16-9.5-1-6, 16-9.5-9-1, 16-9.5-9-2, 16-9.5-9-2.1. Any party may request a medical
review panel by filing a request with the Indiana Commissioner of Insurance. Id at § 16-9.5-9-1.
33. Act of April 14, 1985, Pub L No 177-1985, § 8, codified as amended at Ind Code Ann § 16-
9.5-9-2(b).
34. Act of April 18, 1985, Pub L No 178-1985, § 5, 1985 Ind Acts 1402, codified as amended at
Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-9-2.1.
35. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-4-3.
36. Note, Constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Re-Evaluated, 19 Valp U L Rev 493,
494 (1985) (authored by Catherine Schick Hurlbut); James D. Kemper, Myra C. Selby & Bonnie K.
Simmons, Reform Revisited: A Review of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act Ten Years Later, 19 Ind L Rev
1129, 1131 (1986).
37. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-9-3.
38. Id at § 16-9.5-9-3(a).
39. Id at § 16-9.5-9-3(b).
40. Id at § 16-9.5-9-3(b)(3).
41. Id at § 16-9.5-9-3(b)(4).
42. According to statutory deadlines found in Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-9-3, convening the panel
should take less than two months. Once selected, the panel must meet and make its decision within
180 days. Id at § 16-9.5-9-3.5. See Kemper, Selby & Simmons, 19 Ind L Rev at 1133 (cited in note
36).
43. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-9-7.
44. See Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 13 (cited in note 14).
45. Ind Code Ann §§ 16-9.5-9-4(a), 16-9.5-9-6.
46. Id at § 16-9.5-9-9.
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2. The Patient Compensation Fund. The PCF, administered by the Indiana
Department of Insurance and financed by a surcharge on a provider's primary
malpractice insurance,47 pays large claims to the extent they exceed
$100,000-that is, when the primary insurer of one or more defendants
agrees to settle a claim for at least $100,000, or (more rarely) when a court
renders a verdict in excess of $100,000.48 As of 1985, primary insurers and
the PCF can make periodic payments to claimants, 49 with no limit on the
actual value of the total payment that ultimately comes to the claimant. 50
There is a 15 percent limit on attorneys' fees that are based on recoveries
from the PCF.51
The primary insurer (or the uninsured health care provider) generally pays
claims up to $100,000.52 These claims are resolved privately through
settlements, the customary way in which claims have been resolved under the
common law tort system since the widespread advent of liability insurance. 53
To be eligible for PCF payment, the primary insurer of one or more
defendants must settle a claim for $100,000, or a court must enter a judgment
for more than $100,000. 5 4 Until 1985, one defendant had to contribute
$100,000, part of which could be paid in the future, toward the claimant's
recovery before a case was eligible for the PCF. 55 However, since 1985, at
least $75,000 must be paid at settlement; such a payment, coupled with a
commitment to a future payment of $25,000, qualifies for PCF payment. 56
Most importantly, more than one insurer can contribute to the requisite
amount of primary insurance (although one insurer must pay at least $50,000
at the time of settlement). 57 The cost of an annuity or similar form of security
for a structured settlement is counted in the requisite amount of primary
insurance to be paid at settlement. 58
To obtain funds from the PCF, a claimant must petition the court for
approval of a settlement or payment of a judgment. 59 The other parties
and/or the Commissioner of Insurance may contest the petition, and the
47. Id at § 16-9.5-4-1 (1990 & 1990 Supp).
48. Id at § 16-9.5-2-7.
49. Act of April 14, 1985, Pub L No 179-1985 § 1, 1985 Ind Acts 1403, codified as amended at
Ind Code Ann §§ 16-9.5-2-2.1 to 2.4. See Robin B. Stickney, 1985 Amendments to the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act, 19 Ind L Rev 403, 405 (1986).
50. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-2-1(a).
51. Id at § 16-9.5-5-1(a).
52. Id at § 16-9.5-2-2(d).
53. See generally H. Laurence Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims
Adjustment (Aldene, 2d ed 1980); Fleming James,Jr. & John V. Thornton, The Impact ofInsurance on the
Law of Torts, 15 L & Contemp Probs 430 (Summer 1950).
54. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-2-2(d). If a provider's aggregate insurance ($300,000) has been
exhausted, the entire claim can be paid from the PCF according to a procedure that is substantially
similar to that for claims above $100,000 according to § 16-9.5-2-7.
55. Id at § 16-9.5-4-3.
56. Id at § 16-9.5-2-2.2(b).
57. Id at § 16-9.5-2-2.2(c).
58. Id at § 16-9.5-2-2.2(b).
59. Id at § 16-9.5-4-3(1).
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court may even convene an evidentiary hearing on damages. 60 No judicial
review of a court-approved settlement is available. 6' In the PCF and
associated court proceedings, the liability of the health care provider is
admitted and established. 62
3. Other Key Provisions. The Act contains several other important
provisions, including a shortened statute of limitations 63  and the
establishment of the Residual Malpractice Insurance Authority, which offers
primary insurance for physicians unable to obtain private insurance. 64 The
Act also requires that the disposition of any malpractice claim be reported to
the Indiana Department of Insurance by counsel and insurers. 65
Finally, the Act establishes some linkages with Indiana's formal medical
discipline system. Specifically, the Act requires that the Commissioner of
Insurance report to the appropriate licensure or registration boards the
settlements and judgments against each health care professional for review of
his or her continued fitness to practice. 66 The board may then, if deemed
appropriate, proceed with various disciplinary actions against the health care
provider, including censure, or the probation, suspension, or revocation of
the provider's license.67
III
INDIANA'S EXPERIENCE UNDER REFORMS
This section reviews data on the operation of Indiana's malpractice
reforms as well as data collected on all malpractice claims filed with the
Indiana Department of Insurance from 1975 through 1988.68 This analysis
also relies on claims data from the Medical Protective Company of Fort
Wayne, Indiana-the largest insurer of physicians in the state.
60. Id at §§ 16-9.5-4-3(3), 16-9.5-4-3(5).
61. Id.
62. Id at § 16-9.5-4-3(5).
63. Id at § 16-9.5-3-1. The statute of limitations has been amended to require a claimant to file
a malpractice claim within two years of the alleged malpractice, although minors under age six have
until age eight to file a claim. Id.
64. Id at §§ 16-9.5-8-2, 16-9.5-8-6.
65. Id at § 16-9.5-6-1(b).
66. Id at § 16-9.5-6-2(a).
67. Id. In practice, the various professional disciplinary authorities have taken little or no action
on reported malpractice settlements and judgments, generating considerable public concern
recently. See Hallinan & Headden, June 25, 1990 Indianapolis Star at I (cited in note 6).
68. From 1987 through 1990, the Center for Law and Health at Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis conducted an evaluation of Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act. The evaluation
collected data on all opened and closed claims filed with the Indiana Department of Insurance from
1975 through 1988. These materials are on file at the Center.
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A. General Trends
From 1975 through 1988, 6,225 malpractice claims were filed with the
Indiana Department of Insurance.69 Of these claims, only 2,074 were
closed. 70 It is remarkable that under Indiana's model malpractice reforms,
less than one-third of filed claims were closed over a twelve-year period.
1. Claim Frequency and Severity. The key characteristics of claims affecting the
availability and affordability of medical malpractice insurance are their
frequency and their severity (that is, their size in dollar terms). 71 Increases in
claim frequency and severity helped trigger the two malpractice crises of the
1970s and 1980s. 72 Most legislated tort and insurance reforms are aimed at
controlling the frequency and severity of claims. 73
Despite the reforms adopted, Indiana, like other states, experienced
increases in claim frequency in the 1980s. Table I presents data on the
number of new claims opened per physician from 1977 through 1988. While
actual annual frequency in Indiana is lower than in other states, the rate of
increase in the frequency of Indiana's malpractice claims is comparable to
national trends, 74 with claim frequency in the state increasing by 70 percent
between 1980 and 1985.
Between 1975 and 1988, the mean claim severity in current dollars for
paid Indiana claims was $130,855 ($89,350 for all claims; $12,231 for paid,
non-PCF claims). The median was $14,000. The mean paid claim in 1977
constant dollars was $73,566, and the median was $7,684. A study combining
data collected by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC") 75 and United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") 76
69. Indiana Department of Insurance, Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund as of December 31,
1988, 3 (1988).
70. Id. A claim file is considered "closed" when (1) a claim for damages is not made, (2) the
plaintiff drops the claim, (3) the insurer and plaintiff agree to a financial settlement, (4) a court
renders a verdict, or (5) a settlement is reached through arbitration. US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical
Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed in 1984, 14 (April 1987) ("GAO, Characteristics of Claims
Closed"). In this study, the determination that a claim was closed was made by the Indiana
Department of Insurance, based on these criteria but also often requiring the reporting of
information on settlement from the parties and involved insurers.
71. See Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 7 (cited in note 14).
72. See id at 2-7; Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970s: A Retrospective, 49
L & Contemp Probs 5 (Spring 1986); Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical
Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 L & Contemp Probs 57 (Spring 1986); Frank A. Sloan, State
Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9J Health Pol, Pol'y &
L 629 (Winter 1985).
73. See Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 13-14 (cited in note 14).
74. Id at 7, Figure 2. See also US Gen Acct'g Office, Six State Case Studies Show Claims and
Insurance Costs Still Rise Despite Reforms 17-18 (December 1986) ("GAO, Six Case Studies"); GAO, Case
Study on Indiana at 14-15 (cited in note 5).
75. Nat'l Ass'n Insurance Commissioners, Medical Malpractice Closed Claims, 1975-1978 (1980)
("NAIC, Medical Malpractice Closed Claims").
76. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed (cited in note 70).
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TABLE 1
FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF INDIANA MALPRACTICE CLAIMS,
1977-1988
Mean Paid Claim' Mean Paid Claimb Claims Per 100
Year Current $ Constant 1977 $ Physicians'
1977 $ 4,166 $ 4,166 2.2
1978 53,760 49,935 4.1
1979 79,531 66,398 4.7
1980 74,264 54,615 5.7
1981 26,625 17,740 6.1
1982 85,674 53,731 7.6
1983 111,719 67,952 8.3
1984 128,511 74,975 9.0
d
1985 135,925 76,569 9.7
1986 186,387 103,012 8.5
1987 220,697 117,674 8.0
1988 37,988 19,460
SOURCE: Indiana Malpractice Claims Database, The Center for Law and Health, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis, 1988; Indiana Department of Insurance, 1988.
Indiana Malpractice Claims Data Base, The Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis, 1990.
b Id.
' Indiana Department of Insurance, American Medical Association 1988.
d AMA physician data unavailable for 1984-figure obtained by taking average of 1983 and 1985.
AMA physician data not yet available for 1988.
reported a national mean severity for paid claims at $102,313, using 1984
constant dollars. 77
Claim severity in Indiana also increased substantially over time. Table I
presents data on mean paid claim severity from 1977 through 1988.78
Between 1978 and 1987, the mean paid claim severity in constant 1977
dollars rose from $49,935 to $117,674, an increase of more than 135 percent.
Nationally, the severity of paid claims doubled in real dollars between 1980
and 1986. 79 Basically, then, Indiana's experience with claim severity has been
similar to national trends despite its malpractice reforms.
2. Unique Patterns in Indiana Claim Severity. About 32 percent of Indiana's
closed claims settled without payment; this figure is considerably smaller than
the 57 percent found by GAO in its study of claims closed in 1984.80 This
difference is interesting because it suggests either (1) that the operation of
Indiana's malpractice reforms negatively influences the initial decisions of
77. Frank A. Sloan, Paula M. Mergenhagen & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Effects of Tort Reforms on the
Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L 663, 688,
Appendix 2 (Winter 1989).
78. Although data on closed claims included claims filed as early as 1975, none of these earlier
claims were settled before 1977. Also, the table "endpoints" (1977 and 1988) are excluded from
consideration because the number of claims settled in those years was much lower than the number
of claims settled from 1978 through 1987.
79. Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 7 (cited in note 14).
80. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 19 (cited in note 70).
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plaintiffs' attorneys to bring a claim or (2) that malpractice insurers have a
more expansive view toward settlement.
The distribution of Indiana's mean paid claim severity is especially
interesting. Specifically, very few claims settled between $25,000 and
$100,000 (12 percent) compared with the national data in GAO's study of
1984 closed claims (28.5 percent).8' Large Indiana claims ($100,000 or
more) constituted 30.2 percent of the total, compared with 18.3 percent in the
GAO study.8 2 However, the proportion of small claims (less than $25,000) in
Indiana, 57.9 percent, and in the GAO study, 53.2 percent, were similar.8 3
Moreover, only 14 out of 2,074 claims (0.5 percent) closed under Indiana's
reforms from 1975 through 1988 were paid at levels between $75,000 and
$100,000. The unique patterns of Indiana's mean claim severity are quite
important and, as will be discussed below, suggest that Indiana's system may
be working in a highly unusual fashion.8 4
3. Claim Disposition Time. An average of 23.7 months elapsed between the
time a claim was filed and when it was closed, with virtually no difference
between paid and nonpaid claims. Interestingly, Indiana's average was almost
two months shorter than the GAO study of 1984 claims.8 5 Like other national
studies,8 6 larger claims in Indiana took longer than smaller claims.
4. Characteristics of Indiana Malpractice Claimants. Of Indiana's malpractice
claimants, 59.5 percent were female and 40.5 percent were male. While this
disparity represents a statistically significant difference from Indiana's
population generally, it is quite similar to the percentages of 56.9 and 43.1,
respectively, found in the 1984 GAO study of closed claims.8 7 It is well
documented that women seek more health care services on average than men,
due in part to childbearing needs. 8 This may explain the large representation
of women among malpractice claimants.
Men, however, tended to receive larger claim payments than women,
receiving $105,909 on average compared to $78,887 for women. The mean
paid claim payment for men was $157,709 and $114,188 for women, a highly
significant difference.8 9 This disparity can perhaps be explained in part by the




84. See notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
85. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 35 (cited in note 70) (indicating an average elapsed
time of 25.1 months between the filing and closing of a claim). See also Sloan, Mergenhagen &
Bovbjerg, 14 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 688, Appendix 2 (cited in note 77) (indicating an average
elapsed time of 1.97 years).
86. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 35 (cited in note 70).
87. Id at 28.
88. Lu Ann Aday, Ronald Andersen & Gretchen V. Fleming, Health Care in the United States:
Equitable for W4hom? 104 Table 3.4 (Sage Publications, 1980).
89. The difference is significant at p < .001. This indicates that the probability of such a finding
occurring by chance is less than .001.
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translates into higher awards for lost wages. But this difference also suggests
that, in practice, male lives may be generally valued more highly than female
lives.
Data showed that the ages of Indiana claimants were relatively similar in
distribution to the age data reported by GAO.90 Newborns received the
highest mean award of any age category ($230,592), although as a group they
constituted only 6.4 percent of the total number of claimants. These awards
are almost certainly higher because injuries suffered at birth are likely to
require expensive, often lifelong, care. Other differences between age groups
were not significant.
5. Characteristics of Indiana Malpractice Claims. Most malpractice injuries in
Indiana from 1975 through 1988 occurred in hospitals (68.3 percent, versus
22.2 percent in physicians' offices or clinics). GAO found that 80 percent of
injuries occurred in hospitals, compared to 13 percent in physicians' offices
nationally. 9'
The predominant allegation of negligence mong Indiana's closed claims
was surgical error, followed by errors in diagnosis and treatment. 92 These
were the same top three categories in GAO's study of claims closed in 1984. 93
Further, the distribution of severity of injury94 closely parallels the
distribution reported by the GAO study. Finally, as in the GAO study, award
size varied directly with severity.95
6. Characteristics of Indiana Malpractice Defendants. Physicians and hospitals
accounted for about 80 percent of the 4,230 malpractice defendants in the
closed claims under Indiana's malpractice reforms through 1988. Of all
reported defendants, nearly 60 percent were individual physicians, roughly 7
percent were physician professional corporations, 8 percent were other health
professionals, and approximately 25 percent were hospitals and other health
care institutions. More than 75 percent of claims involved just one or two
90. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 28 (cited in note 70).
91. Id at 24. See also Sloan, Mergenhagen & Bovbjerg, 14 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 688,
Appendix 2 (cited in note 77).
92. Allegations of negligence were classified according to the categories developed by the Risk
Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions. Harvard Risk Management
Foundation, Risk Management Foundation Information System (1987).
93. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 23 (cited in note 70).
94. Severity of injury was classified according to the nine-level system used in other studies: (1)
emotional only (for example, fright); (2) insignificant (for example, lacerations, contusions, rash); (3)
minor temporary disability (for example, infections, improperly set fractures leading to delayed
recovery); (4) major temporary disability (for example, bums, surgical material left in patient,
recovery delayed); (5) minor permanent partial disability (for example, loss of fingers); (6) major
permanent partial disability (for example, deafness, loss of limb, loss of one kidney); (7) major
permanent total disability (for example, paraplegia, brain damage); (8) grave permanent total
disability (for example, quadriplegia, severe brain damage); and (9) death. NAIC, Medical Malpractice
Closed Claims at 8 (cited in note 75). See GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 41 (cited in note 70).
95. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 41 (cited in note 70). See also Randall R. Bovbjerg, et
al,Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 L & Contemp Probs 5
(Winter 1991); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair?, 24 L & Soc'y Rev 601 (Fall 1990).
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defendants. This is not surprising given that one defendant must pay a
substantial portion of the requisite $100,000 to get a claim to the PCF.96 In
claims with a physician as defendant, no settlement or judgment was made or
reached in almost 54 percent of the cases. About one third of physician
defendants were either obstetricians, general surgeons, or orthopedic
surgeons. This is also consistent with the distribution nationally.9 7
Of all specialties, obstetricians represented the largest single group of
malpractice defendants (14.5 percent), with general surgeons a close second
(14.2 percent). These specialty groups, along with anesthesiologists,
orthopedic surgeons, and radiologists, were overrepresented compared to
their respective proportions of Indiana's physician population, while
physicians in family practice, internal medicine, and psychiatry were
underrepresented.98
About 55 percent of Indiana's physician defendants were board certified,
compared to 50 percent reported in the GAO study. 99 Also, about 20 percent
of the Indiana physician defendants were educated in foreign medical schools,
compared to 23 percent nationally. ° ° There were no statistically significant
differences between board certified physicians and nonboard certified
physicians, nor between foreign medical graduates and physicians educated in
the United States, in terms of whether a claim was paid on their behalf.
Hospitals constituted about one-fourth of the defendants in all Indiana
closed claims between 1975 through 1988. Private, nonprofit hospitals
accounted for 69.9 percent of hospital defendants, a proportion substantially
higher than their representation among Indiana's general acute care hospitals
(48.1 percent). On the other hand, public hospitals made up only 29.4
percent of hospital defendants, and for-profit hospitals comprised 0.2 percent
of hospital malpractice defendants. Of Indiana's general acute care hospitals,
45.1 percent are public and 6.8 percent are investor-owned.' 0
B. Performance of the System
1. Operation of the Cap. A controversial issue is the fairness of Indiana's
comprehensive damage cap. Intuitively, comprehensive damage caps seem
unfair to plaintiffs with large claims; they impose a limit on possible
compensation that bears no relation to the damages the plaintiff actually
sustained. Indeed, several state courts have invalidated damage caps on
grounds that they deny plaintiffs their property rights.' 0 2 Only California has
96. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
97. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 55 (cited in note 70).
98. These trends are similar to results of a study of Florida physician defendants. Frank A.
Sloan, et al, Medical Malpractice Experience of Physicians: Predictable or Haphazard?, 262 J Am Med Ass'n
3291, 3292-94 (1989).
99. GAO, Characteristics of Claims Closed at 58 (cited in note 70).
100. Id at 59.
101. Am Hosp Ass'n, Guide to the Health Care Field: 1988 Edition A119-A124 (Am Hosp Ass'n,
1989).
102. See, for example, Wright v Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n., 63 Ill 2d 313, 347 NE2d 736 (1976);
Arneson v Olson, 270 NW2d 125 (ND 1978); Carson v Maurer, 120 NH 925, 424 A2d 825 (1980);
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a court-sanctioned damage cap, but it applies only to noneconomic losses.10 3
Nevertheless, empirical research repeatedly demonstrates that damage caps
are one of the few tort reforms that effectively reduce the severity of
malpractice claims. 0 4
In assessing the operation of Indiana's cap, comparisons with two
neighboring states regarding large ($100,000 or more) malpractice claims are
instructive. 10 5 Unlike Indiana, Michigan and Ohio have only sporadically
adopted malpractice reforms and have never implemented a damage cap. 10 6
However, with respect to other, more general tort reforms, all three states are
rather similar.' 0 7 Also, in terms of aggregate variables identified by several
Waggoner v Gibson, 647 F Supp 1102 (ND Tex 1986). But see, for example, Prendergast v Nelson, 199
Neb 97, 256 NW2d 657 (1977);Jones v St. Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 879, 55 P2d 399 (1976); Boyd v
Bulula, 877 F2d 1191 (4th Cir 1989), rev'g 647 F Supp 781 (WD Va 1986); Etheridge v Medical Center
Hosp., 237 Va 87, 376 SE2d 525 (1989); LaMar v NME Hosps., 542 S2d 753 (La App 1989), cert
denied, 551 S2d 1334 (1989). See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering, " 83 Nw U L Rev 908, 956-58 (discussing
caps generally); 968-74 (discussing their constitutionality) (1989). See also Kathryn L. Vezina,
Constitutional Challenges to Caps on Tort Damages: Is Tort Reform the Dragon Slayer or is it the Dragon?, 42 Me
L Rev 218 (1990); Jill Oliverio, To Cap or Not to Cap Damage Awards: That is the Constitutional Question, 91
W Va L Rev 519 (1988); Jesse M. Wagner & Ronald E. Reiter, Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice:
Standards of Constitutional Review, 1987 Det Coil L Rev 1005 (1987); Paul M. Barrett, Tort Reform Fight
Shifts to State Court, Wall St J 27 (September 19, 1988).
103. Cal Civ Code § 3333.2 (West, 1970 & Supp 1989). See Fein v Permanente Medical Group, 38
Cal3d 137, 695 P2d 665, 211 Cal Rptr 368 (1985), appeal dismissed, 474 US 892 (1985). See
Bovbjerg, 22 U C Davis L Rev at 525 & nil5 (cited in note 2).
104. Danzon, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 77-78 (cited in note 72); Patricia M. Danzon, Medical
Malpractice. Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 82 (Harv U Press, 1985); Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A.
Lilliard, Medical Malpractice 26 (RAND, 1982). Contrast Sloan, 9 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 633-34,
639-43 (cited in note 72); Sloan, Mergenhagen & Bovbjerg, 14 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 663 (cited
in note 77). See generally Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull (cited in note 14).
Danzon found that caps on damages reduce the average severity of the claim by 23%. Danzon, 49
L & Contemp Probs at 72 (cited in note 72). More recently, Sloan, Mergenhagen & Bovbjerg found
that damage caps on total payments in particular achieved savings in claim payments of up to 39%.
Sloan, Mergenhagen & Bovbjerg, 14 J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 678 (cited in note 77).
105. William P. Gronfein & Eleanor D. Kinney, Controlling Large Medical Malpractice Claims: The
Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps (recently accepted for publication in J Health Pol, Pol'y & L).
106. In 1975, Michigan authorized voluntary, binding arbitration in lieu of a court trial, but this
arbitration alternative has not been used to any significant extent. Michigan Commissioner of
Insurance, Claims Experience and Market Conditions for Medical Malpractice Insurance 26 (1989). See also
Rhoda M. Powser & Frances Hamermesh, Medical Malpractice Crisis the Second Time Around: Why Not
Arbitrate?, 8 J Legal Med 283 (1987); Mary Bedikian, Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act: Michigan's
Experience with Arbitration, 10 AmJ L & Med 287 (1984-85). In 1975, Ohio enacted a $200,000 limit
on noneconomic damage except for wrongful death and mandated compulsory arbitration of
malpractice claims. The Ohio Supreme Court immediately ruled that these reforms were
unconstitutional; thus, they were never implemented. Simon v St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 NE2d
903 (Ohio 1976). See Mary Ann Willis, Limitation on Recovery of Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases: A
Violation of Equal Protection?, 54 U Cin L Rev 1329 (1986); Thomas J. O'Connell & Amy Tolnitch,
Ohio's Attempt to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or Meaningless?, 9 U Dayton L Rev 361
(1984).
107. Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana all adopted the two tort reforms (that is, shortened statutes of
limitations and modified the common law collateral source rule) that Danzon found effective in
reducing claim frequency and severity. Danzon, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 71, 72, 77 (cited in note
72); Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 166 (cited in note 104). All three states tightened their statutes of
limitations for malpractice in the mid-1970s. Ind Code Ann § 16-9.5-3-1; Mich Comp Laws Ann
§ 600.5805(4) (West, 1987); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2305.10 (Page, 1981 & 1989 Supp). All three
states also modified the common law collateral source rule in the late 1980s to require some offset of
collateral payments from damage awards, although Ohio's rule does not apply to medical
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experts as having an important influence on claim severity, Indiana, Michigan,
and Ohio are again reasonably similar. These variables include: level of
urbanization;' 08 number of physicians per 10,000 persons; 0 9 number of
lawyers per 10,000 persons;" I 0 per capita income;"' and ratio of surgeons to
all physicians." 12 With respect to these variables, Indiana's figures are lower
than either Michigan's or Ohio's.' ' 3 Thus, one would expect that claim
payments in Indiana would be lower than in either Michigan or Ohio.
In fact, however, the amount of compensation going to claimants with
large malpractice payments in Indiana is, on average, substantially higher than
in either Michigan or Ohio."14 The mean severity of Indiana's large claims
($100,000 or more) between 1975 and 1988, in current dollars, was $404,832;
by contrast, Michigan's was $290,022 and Ohio's was $303,220." 15 The
median payment for large claims was $435,283 in Indiana, $180,000 in
Michigan, and $200,000 in Ohio." 16 Further, 27.9 percent of Indiana's PCF
cases received the maximum allowable payment of $500,000, while only 13
percent of Michigan's and Ohio's claims were paid at this level or above."1
7
2. Operation of the Medical Review Panel. Surprisingly, medical review panels
were invoked in only 11.7 percent of claims closed before December 31, 1988,
although a panel had reviewed 1,452 open claims as of this date." 8 For 52
percent of the PCF defendants for whom the PCF paid claims, no medical
review panel was convened. 19 Of the defendants in closed claims whose
cases were considered by a medical review panel, only 189 (22.4 percent)
were found to have committed malpractice.' 20
One reason for these startling findings regarding the use of the panel in
closed claims is that the panel review process has proven to be quite time-
consuming, The average time between the filing of a complaint and the
issuance of a final panel opinion is thirty-two months. 12 1 Some anecdotal
evidence suggests that slowness in forming and convening medical review
malpractice. Ind Code Ann §§ 34-4-36-1 to 3; Mich Comp Laws Ann § 600.6301; Ohio Rev Code
Ann § 2317.45.
108. Danzon, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 75-76 (cited in note 72).
109. Sloan, 9J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 638 (cited in note 72); Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 70-72
(cited in note 104).
110. Sloan, 9J Health Pol, Pol'y & L at 631 (cited in note 72).
111. Roger Feldman, The Determinants of Medical Malpractice Incidents: Theory of Contingency Fees and
Empirical Evidence, 8 Atlantic Econ J 59, 61-62 (1979).
112. Danzon, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 74, 79 (cited in note 72).
113. Gronfein & Kinney, J Health Pol, Pol'y & L (cited in note 105).
114. Id. The Michigan and Ohio data derive from all large claims ($100,000 or more) filed with
the Medical Protective Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana between 1977 and 1988. For the relevant
period, the Medical Protective Company had about one-third of the market in Michigan and Ohio.
115. Id. The difference between these three means was highly significant at p < .001.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund at 3 (cited in note 69).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id at 5. See also Kemper, Selby & Simmons, 19 Ind L Rev at 1133-35 (cited in note 36);
Lester F. Murphy, Pitfalls in Medical Malpractice Panel Practice, 28 Res Gestae 178, 178-79 (1985).
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panels ultimately leads to delays in resolving malpractice claims,' 22 and
perhaps also to the large backlog in open claims described above.' 23
These findings are quite interesting, given the role the medical review
panel was designed to play in affording accessible expert review to determine
liability early in a claim. However, as the experience with closed claims
reveals, the medical review panel in fact plays an unexpectedly reduced role in
the adjudication of malpractice claims. It should be noted that Pennsylvania
and Florida courts have invalidated screening panels on grounds that they
impose unconstitutionally impermissible delays. 124 To the extent that delays
in convening medical review panels contribute to the fact that only one-third
of filed claims were closed from the start of reforms in 1975 through 1988, the
theories advanced in the Pennsylvania and Florida cases could prove
persuasive in a future constitutional challenge to Indiana's reforms. It is also
noteworthy that one Indiana trial court ruled the Act unconstitutional because
of undue delays in the operation of Indiana's medical review panels; however,
the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the panel review
process was not significantly longer than the disposition of lawsuits in the
common law tort system.' 25
3. Impact of the By-Pass Amendment. As noted above, a 1985 legislative
amendment authorized the filing of small claims ($15,000 or less) directly in
state court, thus by-passing the medical review panel.' 26 Some commentators
anticipated that this authority would generate a flood of claims filed in court
and effectively undercut Indiana's malpractice reforms.' 27 However, the by-
pass amendment has rarely, if ever, been used.' 28 Apparently, plaintiffs'
attorneys are unwilling to acknowledge at the inception of a lawsuit that its
value is less than $15,000.
4. PCF Performance. Between 1975 and 1988, the PCF paid about 410
claims. The great majority of PCF claims were settled; only twenty-one claims
were paid following court judgments, and one claim was settled after trial.' 2 9
Once claims reached the PCF, recoveries were generous. The mean payment
was $405,297 in real dollars, '3 0 and the average severity of injury index was at
122. Kemper, Selby & Simmons, 19 Ind L Rev at 1133 (cited in note 36); Murphy, 28 Res Gestae
at 180-81 (cited in note 121).
123. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
124. Aldana v Holub, 381 S2d 231 (Fla 1980); Matos v Thompson, 491 Pa 385, 421 A2d 190 (1980).
See Bovbjerg, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 524 & n109 (cited in note 2).
125. Warnick v Cha, No SC-83-163 (Jasper County Superior Ct 1983), rev'd, Cha v Warnick, 476
NE2d 109 (Ind), cert denied, 474 US 920 (1985).
126. See note 34 and accompanying text.
127. See Kevin C. Murray, "Small Claims" Suits: Legislative Erosion of the Medical Malpractice Act,
Marion County Med Soc'y Bull 10 (February 1986).
128. The Indiana Department of Insurance has no record of this procedure being used in any
claim. (The Act requires health care providers and insurers to report the disposition of all
malpractice claims. See note 65 and accompanying text.)
129. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund at 3 (cited in note 69).
130. This figure differs from the mean large claim reported at note 115 and accompanying text
because that figure included claims for which no additional payments were made from the PCF.
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the level that represents major permanent and total disability. About 14.9
percent of PCF claims involved injuries to infants at birth, while 29.8 percent
of PCF claims were wrongful death cases.
The PCF's financial condition over the years has been troublesome. The
PCF has always operated on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Since 1975, the PCF
surcharge has generated $150.8 million in revenue, while the PCF has paid
$135.3 million in claim payments.13 1 In 1988, the PCF collected $41.3 million
from the surcharge and paid $21.5 million for claims, leaving a balance of
$29.8 million. 132 A transfer of $7.2 million from the reserves of the state's
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Commission rescued the PCF from
insolvency in 1984.133 As discussed below, the surcharge on health care
providers to finance the PCF has risen substantially since the Act's
inception. 134
5. Use of Structured Settlements. Periodic payments and associated structured
settlements are ostensibly designed to ensure that damage awards will remain
available to claimants for as long as they continue to need compensation.13 5
Structured settlements are particularly useful for claimants, especially because
some evidence exists that a significant number of them exhaust large damage
awards quickly, thus leaving their future needs largely unmet.'3 6 On the other
hand, structured settlements are attractive to insurers because the companies
save by avoiding present cash payments and by using annuities and similar
products from their other lines of business to help finance such settlements.
In many Indiana claims, the use of periodic payments has resulted in creative
structured settlements that benefit the claimants by permitting them to
receive compensation worth more than the $500,000 cap; nevertheless, a
concern exists that, after attorneys' fees are paid, claimants actually receive
very little in present compensation. 3 7 Also, in a very few cases, serious
abuses have occurred.' 3 8
In a judicial challenge brought by the Commissioner of Insurance, the
Indiana Court of Appeals upheld two structured settlements entered into
before 1985 in which insurers paid only $10,000 at settlement, with the
131. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund at 1 (cited in note 69).
132. Id.
133. GAO, Case Study on Indiana at 3 (cited in note 5).
134. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
135. Comment, Making a Client Whole: Rhetoric or Reality?, 12 S U L Rev 281, 286 (1986) (authored
by David Ferguson); Note, Periodic Payment Plans: Are Annuities Adequately Protecting the Personal Injury
Plaintifffrom Inflation, Providing Accurate Attorney's Fees and Promoting the Compensatory Goal of Our Tort Law
System?, 12 Ohio N U L Rev 271, 272 (1985) (authored by James S. Marello); T. V. Mangelsdorf,
Structured Settlements in Review: The Fundamental Concept, 4 Am J Trial Advoc 559, 561 (1981).
136. Note, 12 Ohio N U L Rev at 271 (cited in note 135).
137. Hallinan & Headden, June 26, 1990 Indianapolis Star at 9 (cited in note 6).
138. In one dramatic illustration of such abuses, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company
agreed to settle a case with a claimant by.paying $100,000 to get the case to the PCF if the claimant
agreed to repay St. Paul $25,000 out of the settlement received. The claimant subsequently reported
this arrangement to the Indiana Attorney General, and the Indiana Department of Insurance
persuaded St. Paul to repay this $25,000 to the claimant. SeeJoseph T. Hallinan, Insurer's Proposal for
$25,000 Loan Draws State's Ire, Indianapolis Star 8 (June 26, 1990).
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balance to be paid in future payments, noting that in seventy-five cases
claimants gained access to the PCF following a structured settlement.' 39
Thus, the 1985 legislative amendments specifically authorizing structured
settlements and establishing mandatory contribution amounts for insurers
were actually intended to reform the practice regarding structured settlement
that had evolved.140
Since 1985, periodic payments by primary insurers and the PCF have been
used in structured settlements of PCF claims. Of the 264 PCF claims settled
between 1985 and 1988, 32.6 percent involved periodic payments. Also, 23.9
percent of PCF claims during this period involved contributions from multiple
health care providers or their insurers to activate the PCF. These data
suggest that insurers continued to find the periodic payment option attractive
in settling claims.
6. Litigation Costs. Under Indiana's system, attorneys' fees are limited for
claims paid from the PCF, 14 1 ostensibly in order to maximize payments to
claimants. While it appears that Indiana claimants with large claims pay less
because of the cap on fees than they otherwise would under a common law
system, some reason for concern exists because plaintiffs' attorneys have been
able to charge expenses in addition to attorneys' fees, effectively increasing
their total payments under the capped system.
Defense costs in Indiana compare favorably with defense costs in other
states. The Medical Protective Company reports that its defense costs were
markedly lower in Indiana than in either Ohio or Michigan. Specifically,
between 1984 and 1988, Medical Protective paid 46 percent more in allocated
loss adjustment expenses to close claims in Ohio and over 100 percent more
in such expenses to close claims in Michigan. 142
7. Malpractice Insurance Premiums. Given these trends, it is interesting that
Indiana's malpractice insurance premiums have remained low compared to
other states. According to a GAO study, Indiana health care providers
continue to pay among the lowest malpractice insurance premiums in the
nation.' 43 Specifically, Indiana physicians pay lower premiums than do
physicians in the neighboring states of Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and Kentucky,
although with the PCF surcharge, physicians in comparable classes in
Indianapolis, Indiana, now pay only slightly less than their counterparts in
Cincinnati, Ohio, although they receive coverage for $500,000 in damages
compared to $100,000 for their neighboring physicians. They also have total
immunity from claims above $500,000, indemnity that physicians in
139. See Eakin v Mitchell-Leech, 557 NE2d 1057 (Ind App 1990), transfer to US Supreme Court
denied, No 45A02-8807-CV-213 (February 8, 1991).
140. See notes 49-50, 56-58 and accompanying text.
141. See note 51 and accompanying text.
142. Gronfein & Kinney, J Health Pol, Pol'y & L (cited in note 105).
143. US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Insurance Costs Increased but Varied among Physicians
and Hospitals 30-34, 60-69 (September 1986); GAO, Six Case Studies at 15-16 (cited in note 74). See
also Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 5-6 (cited in note 14).
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neighboring states do not enjoy. 144 It should be noted that physician carriers
in Indiana offer occurrence insurance, which covers all claims that occurred
during the policy period (whether or not the claim was actually brought within
that period), as opposed to claims-made insurance, which covers only claims
actually made during the policy period. Claims-made insurance is generally
all that is available to physicians in Ohio, Michigan, and most other states.
Nevertheless, the experience with imposing the surcharge to finance the PCF
should dispel complacency about low insurance premiums in the long term.
As discussed above, ' 45 the PCF's solvency has been a persistent concern since
the Act's inception. From 1975 through 1982, the surcharge on providers to
support the PCF was 10 percent of malpractice premiums.' 46 By 1988, the
surcharge increased to 125 percent. 147
8. Subrogation, Statutory Liens, and the Collateral Source Rule. In a capped
system, various remedies and rules accord rights to third parties to share in
the claimant's tort recovery or require reductions in the claimant's recovery to
adjust for compensation from other sources. The operation of these devices
raises important concerns. These rights and rules may be analytically
appealing in an abstract sense because they appear to prevent possible
windfalls to claimants. However, one must question their fairness in a capped
system. When a damage cap both sets a categorical limit on what can be
awarded and permits attorneys to be paid off the top of awards, claimants may
actually receive very little after third parties have received reimbursement of
their expenses.
Indiana has adopted several statutory lien provisions to permit
hospitals,' 4 8 workers compensation insurers, 149 and the state Medicaid
program' 50 to obtain reimbursement from plaintiff's tort recoveries. Indiana
common law recognizes the right of health insurers, pursuant to contract, to
recover reimbursement for medical expenses from tort recoveries gained by
their insureds.' 5 ' Also, as noted above, ' 5 2 Indiana's legislature abrogated the
common law collateral source rule, which prohibits the admission at trial of
evidence of other sources of compensation available to the plaintiff.' 53 These
144. Mullen, Update at S-15, chart F (cited in note 24).
145. See notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
146. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund at 61 (cited in note 69).
147. Id.
148. Ind Code Ann § 32-8-26-1.
149. Id at §§ 22-3-2-13, 22-3-7-36. See Dearing v Perry, 499 NE2d 268 (Ind App 1982); Hagerman
v Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 175 Ind App 293, 371 NE2d 394 (Ind App 1978). See generally Robert E.
Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial
Practices § 3.10(a)(7), 228-32 (West, 1988).
150. Ind Code Ann § 12-1-7-24.6.
151. See, for example, Costello v Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 441 NE2d 506 (Ind App 1982); Hagerman,
175 Ind App 293, 371 NE2d 394. See generally Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.10(a)(7), at 228-
32 (cited in note 149).
152. See note 12 and accompanying text.
153. Ind Code Ann § 34-4-36-1. See generally Wilkins, 20 Ind L Rev 399 (cited in note 12).
Under Indiana's rule, the trier of fact calculates reductions in awards for collateral benefits received.
Life insurance payments and other death benefits, insurance benefits directly paid for by the plaintiff
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authorities have been invoked in many medical malpractice claims, including
8 percent of PCF claims, for a total of $2,256,596. The Indiana Medicaid
program has imposed the great majority of these liens, while Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Indiana, Inc., the Medicare program, and hospitals have
imposed a few.
The operation of these rights of third parties in a capped system indeed
raises fundamental questions of fairness, as Indiana's actual experience
demonstrates. There have been instances where claimants have received very
little from a large recovery because third parties and the plaintiff's attorney
have been paid first. 15 4 Particularly disturbing is the interaction of the
damage cap with these statutory liens. Arguably, the cap is designed to hold
down claim severity and thereby make malpractice insurance more affordable
for health care providers. Thus, the cap represents a transfer of wealth from a
few claimants with very large claims to the health care providers that
collectively finance the system for compensating malpractice injury. Such a
transfer is appropriate as long as claimants are not harmed substantially.
or his family, and governmental benefits received by the plaintiff before trial are excluded, but
worker's compensation is not. Ind Code Ann § 34-4-36-2.
154. The following letter from a 43-year-old PCF claimant to the Indiana Department of
Insurance dramatically illustrates the injustice that can result from imposing such liens in a capped
system:
During April of 1981, I became a victim of medical malpractice. . . . To meet his one
hundred thousand dollar ($100,000.00) obligation, Dr. [Defendant] purchased an annuity
that will mature in fifteen (15) years. According to my attorney, I will be awarded four
hundred thousand dollars ($400,000.00) on the fifteenth of this month (July 15th, 1987). I
feel it is necessary to write to you to show you how that amount will be divided up and thus
showing the injustice of the state's medical malpractice system.
During the last five and one-half (5.5) years, the Indiana State Department of Public Welfare
(through Medicaid) has spent two hundred thirty-nine thousand eighty-two dollars and
forty-two cents ($239,082.42) for my care as of mid-June 1987. A lien for this amount has
been filed and must be honored accordingly. The attorneys' fees are one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000.00) plus expenses incurred for this case. Those expenses have been set at
thirty thousand dollars. The balance is the actual compensation I'll receive until the annuity
matures. The following table illustrates the settlement's division.
$400,000.00 Amount to be received July 15
239,082.42 To the State Welfare Department
130,000.00 Attorney fees and expenses
30,917.58 TO THE VICTIM
ByJuly 15th, Medicaid will probably increase the lien by two thousand dollars ($2000.00).
The Malpractice incident resulted in the loss of function in my left arm and both legs. I also
lost bladder and bowel control making the possibility of employment almost impossible.
I'm living in a nursing home and my part of the settlement will not cover one year's
expenses. This means I'll be back on Medicaid and in fifteen (15) years (when the annuity
matures) it will be claimed through a lien by Medicaid.
I'm forty-three (43) years old. If financially able to do so I could live on my own with an
attendant, but I've lost more than bodily functions. I've also lost independence and my
liberty. That loss of independence and liberty was through medical malpractice yet as the
victim, I'll not be allowed to regain my liberty and independence through just
compensation.
Letter of Malpractice Claimant to Indiana Commissioner of Insurance (July 4, 1987). This letter is
available from The Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis,
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
However, poor claimants on Medicaid are disproportionately victimized by
these liens.
When third parties are placed ahead of the claimant who, to serve other
societal goals, already must expect limited compensation, a clear ethical issue
emerges: whose interest is more deserving? Medicaid liens raise more
complicated issues, because Medicaid eligibility rules require applicants to
deplete resources before becoming eligible for benefits. Nevertheless, future
medical expenses represent only part of special and general damages, which
also include losses due to inability to work, pain and suffering, 55 or, in the
case of wrongful death, losses to the survivors. 156 Allowing third parties to
receive full payment from claimants' damage awards under a capped system
embodies the erroneous assumption that claimants' damages are basically




Indiana's claims are adjudicated and paid under the most comprehensive
and severe set of insurance and tort reforms in the nation.1 7 Yet Indiana's
malpractice reforms operate in a way that softens the expected impact of these
reforms and results in a comparatively generous compensation system. In
Indiana's system, a variety of subtle incentives appear to encourage the
insurers of health care providers to settle claims, particularly large claims,
with little concern about the defendant's fault.
Insurers are apparently pushing claims involving serious injury to the PCF
by agreeing to pay claimants the requisite amount to make cases eligible for
PCF payment. If a structured settlement can be arranged with other insurers
contributing to the initial settlement, the insurer is in an even better position.
In any event, upon settlement, the insurer has exhausted the limits of the
insured's primary policy and no longer has any interest or real obligation to
provide a defense to the insured. Given that the medical review panel is an
optional proceeding, insurers have much to gain and little to lose by forgoing
a costly defense before the review panel and instead expeditiously pushing a
borderline case to the PCF.
The fact that, compared to the GAO study, fewer Indiana claims are paid
between $25,000 and $100,000, more Indiana claims are paid at $100,000
and above, and only fourteen claims fell between $75,000 and $100,000 in a
twelve-year period' 58 is persuasive evidence that insurers may be pushing
substantial claims to the PCF that ordinarily would be settled for under
$100,000. Insurers are apparently willing to add a few dollars to get a claim
155. Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 8.1, 540-51 (West, 1973).
156. Id at § 8.3, 556-57.
157. See Sloan & Bovbjerg, Health Ins Ass'n Am Res Bull at 19 (cited in note 14).
158. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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to the PCF in order to terminate their obligation to defend the claim and pay
related expenses.
The statutory constraints on what can be considered in a PCF decision to
pay a claim also uniquely affect the adjudication and resolution of large
malpractice claims. By law, the PCF can consider only the amount of the
claimant's damages; it must assume that the defendant's liability is
admitted.' 59 Consequently, the factors that influence the ultimate payment of
claims in the common law tort system, such as the jury's final decision on
liability or the expenses involved in pressing a claim through trial, 160 are not
considered in establishing the amount of compensation for the claimant.
One crucial result of these incentives in Indiana's system is that a state-run
insurance fund is paying large sums of money to most PCF claimants without
a formal determination of fault. As a practical matter, the only required
indications of a defendant's liability are (1) a private decision by a malpractice
insurer-or several insurers in a structured settlement-that its exposure
(including likely litigation costs) is such that it will pay a sizable sum to the
claimant, and (2) the PCF's subsequent assessment of the value of the
claimant's damages.
Is this no-fault by accident? The distinguishing characteristics of no-fault
schemes are the imposition of liability for designated injuries regardless of the
defendant's fault, limits on damages generally paid according to a fixed
schedule, and a broader spectrum of compensable injuries for which payment
is not contingent on fault. 161
159. See note 62 and accompanying text.
160. Ross, Settled Out of Court at I I l (cited in note 53).
161. In the mid-1970s, when sharply increased severity and frequency of medical malpractice
claims spawned a "crisis" in the availability and affordability of medical malpractice insurance, tort
scholars looked to the no-fault concept as a potential solution. See, for example, Clark C. Havighurst
& Laurence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance'---A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and
Quality Assurance, 51 Millbank Mem Fund Q 125 (Spring 1973); Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for
Medical Accidents, 121 U Pa L Rev 590 (1973); Clark C. Havighurst, Medical Adversity Insurance: Has its
Time Come?, 1975 Duke L J 1233; Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective
No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injury, 60 Minn L Rev 501 (1976). See also Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Compulsory "Hospital Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical
Malpractice, " 31 U Chi L Rev 279 (1964). Several scholars concluded that the no-fault concept was
not suitable for medical malpractice because of the difficulty and cost involved in distinguishing an
injury for which compensation would be paid from an unavoidable bad result due to the claimant's
underlying illness. Keeton, 121 U Pa L Rev 590 (cited in this note); Guido Calabresi, The Problem of
Malpractice-Trying to Round Out the Circle, and Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and
Cure, both in Simon Rottenburg, ed, The Economics of Medical Malpractice at 233, 239 and 261-62
respectively (Am Enterprise Inst for Pub Pol'y Res, 1978).
But since the 1970s, scholars have maintained that these problems could be ironed out and
medical malpractice claims could still be resolved through some type of no-fault scheme. Laurence
R. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 L & Contemp Probs 277 (Spring 1986); Jeffrey
O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49
L & Contemp Probs 125 (Spring 1986). See generally Ronald S. Latz, No-Fault Liability and Medical
Malpractice: A Viability Analysis, 10 J Legal Med 479 (1989). In the late 1970s, the American Bar
Association seriously explored the concept and developed proposals. Am Bar Ass'n, Designated
Compensable Event System: A Feasibility Study 5 (Am Bar Ass'n, 1979). At least two states, Virginia in
1987 and Florida in 1988, adopted a no-fault-like system for adjudication and compensation of birth
injuries. Va Code §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (1989); Fla Stat Ann §§ 766.301 to .316 (West, 1990). See
Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Virginia Obstetrical No-
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Indiana's system does contain some of the central features of a no-fault
compensation system. Perhaps most importantly, Indiana's system weakens
the requirement that the plaintiff prove fault on the part of the defendant
before recovery, as evidenced by the fact that relatively few medical review
panels have been convened to adjudicate liability. As noted above, a medical
review panel was convened in only 11.7 percent of claims closed from 1975
through 1988.162 Furthermore, for over half (52 percent) of the defendants
for whom the PCF paid claims during this period, no medical review panel
was ever convened. 163
The adjudication process is somewhat more streamlined in Indiana,
particularly for large PCF claims. Adjudication costs are lower in Indiana
compared to neighboring states,IM and claimant attorneys' fees for large
claims are statutorily fixed. 165 In addition, Indiana claims overall are
adjudicated in a somewhat shorter time frame (nearly two months shorter)
than claims nationally.' 66
Finally, Indiana's system pays more claims at more generous levels (which
is not necessarily characteristic of a no-fault system), but is constrained by the
upper limit imposed by the cap. As discussed above, Indiana's mean large-
claim severity between 1975 and 1988 was more than $100,000 greater than
either Michigan's or Ohio's, and nearly twice the number of Indiana claims
over $100,000 were paid at the $500,000 level.' 67 Further, Indiana had
comparatively more large claims, with proportionately fewer claims settling
for under $100,000 than the national sample.' 68 Also, of claims brought,
more claims are paid in Indiana compared to other states-a trend more
typical of no-fault systems.169
Fault Statute, 74 Va L Rev 1451 (1988); Jeffrey O'Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on Market Approaches: A
Response to Professor Epstein, 74 Va L Rev 1475 (1988). One group of the various no-fault proposals
and enacted plans is characterized as neo-no-fauh early compensation schemes. See, for example,
Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt
Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw U L Rev 589 (1982); O'Connell, 49 L & Contemp Probs
125 (cited in this note); W. Henson Moore &John S. Hoff, H.R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation
System for Medical Malpractice, 49 L & Contemp Probs 117 (Spring 1986). A second category is limited-
no-fault, such as specified events schemes. Am Bar Ass'n, Designated Compensable Event System (cited in
this note); Tancredi, 49 L & Contemp Probs 277 (cited in this note); Havighurst & Tancredi, 51
Millbank Mem Fund Q 125 (cited in this note). See also James A. Henderson, Jr., The Virginia Birth-
Related Injury Compensation Act: Limited No-Fault Statutes as Solutions to the "Medical Malpractice Crisis, " in
Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger, eds, 2 Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical
Care 194; 196 (Nat'l Acad Press, 1989). A third group is pure no-fault. See Latz, 10J Legal Med at
488-92 (cited in this note); Ehrenzweig, 31 U Chi L Rev 270 (cited in this note); William H. L.
Dornette, Medical Injury Insurance-A Possible Remedy for the Malpractice Problem, in Nicholas N. Kittrie,
Harold L. Hirsh & Glen Wegner, eds, Medicine, Law and Public Policy 26 (AMS Press, 1975).
162. See note 118 and accompanying text.
163. See note 119 and accompanying text.
164. See note 142 and accompanying text.
165. See note 151 and accompanying text.
166. See note 85 and accompanying text.
167. See notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
168. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
169. See note 80 and accompanying text.
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Admittedly, the disposition of claims in Indiana, including large claims, is
similar to the process for settling claims in a common law tort system, with
Indiana's PCF playing the role of a private secondary insurer. Nevertheless,
the unique incentives in Indiana's system that encourage insurers to push
claims to the PCF without medical review, and the PCF's mandate to consider
only damages in determining compensation levels, represent crucial
departures from the common law tort system and encourage insurers to
behave more as if operating under a no-fault system. The unique distribution
of claim severity and the comparative generosity in payment levels for
medium and large claims,' 70 coupled with the infrequent use of the panel
review process (at least for closed claims), 17' confirm the impression that such
incentives are operating in Indiana's system, and that the settlement process
under Indiana's system differs from that under a common law, fault-based
system.
In sum, by adjudicating and resolving claims, although not particularly
expeditiously, through an informal process supervised by an administrative
agency, Indiana's system reduces the need to prove fault. The interesting
feature of Indiana's system is that the design and operation of the PCF and
the rules governing eligibility for payment of claims by the PCF create
incentives for insurers to behave as if Indiana had a no-fault system without an
explicit legal mandate to do so.
Indiana's system also offers intriguing opportunities to implement a new
generation of reforms, such as a designated compensable events scheme
proposed by leading torts scholars. 172 Specifically, Indiana could easily
incorporate a designated events scheme into its system expressly for PCF
claims, since the PCF process already identifies large claims that would be the
most likely candidates for the application of such a scheme. Upon selecting
and installing a particular designated events scheme, the Department of
Insurance staff could review cases for conformity with the criteria for the
compensable events and decide whether compensation was warranted. These
cases could then be referred to a panel of experts retained by the PCF to
review each case and decide on compensation under the designated events
scheme and an associated schedule of damages.
The centralized nature of Indiana's system simplifies legislative or
regulatory changes that would be needed to implement no-fault reforms,
170. See notes 81-84, 114-17 and accompanying text.
171. See notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
172. A designated compensable events system would identify a limited set of adverse outcomes
occurring with some frequency during medical treatment, fix an amount of damages specific to each
outcome, and award that amount to a patient whenever he or she suffers the particular outcome.
Such a system would eliminate inquiry regarding whether the physician was at fault for the injury.
See Laurence R. Tancredi, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Dan S. Gaylin, Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on
the Performance of a Selective No-Fault System (submitted for publication); Laurence R. Tancredi &
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A
Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripefor a Test, 54 L & Contemp Probs 147 (Spring 1991); Tancredi, 49 L
& Contemp Probs 277 (cited in note 161); Am Bar Ass'n, Designated Compensable Event System (cited in
note 161); Havighurst & Tancredi, 51 Millbank Mem Fund Q 125 (cited in note 161).
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which have heretofore been relegated to theory because of the practical
difficulties posed by implementation. The supervision of the system by the
Department of Insurance ensures the accountability and performance to
which the public is entitled. By making compensation faster and more
predictable, such reforms might more directly address the need for adequate




Indiana's experience, particularly with large claims, suggests that relatively
subtle administrative arrangements for the management of claims at the state
level may influence whether claimants are treated fairly by a system that is
tightly structured to control claim severity and thus the price and availability
of malpractice insurance for providers. The operation of the Indiana system
provides exciting opportunities for further experimentation with no-fault
reforms. Nevertheless, Indiana's experience should caution reformers, critics,
and other observers to look closely at the more mundane, detailed aspects of
how the supposedly strict, insurer- and provider-oriented reforms exemplified
in Indiana's current malpractice system operate in practice before reaching
intuitively appealing conclusions about the fairness of the reforms or the need
for additional reforms.
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APPENDIX
Data from this study is from the Indiana Malpractice Claims Data Base
("IMDB") obtained from all Indiana malpractice claims filed with the Indiana
Department of Insurance from 1975 through 1988. Collected data fall in
three categories: claims, claimants, and defendants. Data on claims include:
(1) filing date; (2) date of final disposition; (3) allegations of negligence; (4)
medical review panel decision, if any; (5) results of court proceedings, if any;
(6) amount of award, if any; and (7) nature of final disposition. On claimants,
the data include: (1) demographic characteristics of claimants, for example,
age, sex, marital status, residential county, and zip code; (2) the medical
condition giving rise to the malpractice, including initial diagnosis and any
misdiagnosis; (3) any operations or procedures performed on the claimant;
(4) injuries sustained during the incident of alleged malpractice, including
initial and ultimate injuries; and (5) severity of injury. On physician
defendants, the data include: (1) date of licensure; (2) medical education; (3)
location of practice; (4) self-reported specialty; (5) nature of medical practice;
and (5) board certification. For hospital defendants, data include: (1) number
of beds; (2) type of corporate control; (3) teaching status; (4) geographic
location; and (5) case mix.
For claimant characteristics and damage awards, the data collection
instrument developed by GAO for its study of claims closed in 1984 was
used.' Whenever possible, information on diagnosis, procedures performed,
and injuries came directly from the patient's hospital chart for the treatment
episode in which the alleged malpractice occurred. A registered medical
records administrator coded data on diagnoses, injuries, procedures, and
operations using the ICD-9-CM disease classification system.2
For allegations of negligence, the classification categories developed by
the Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions were
used. 3 The Risk Management Foundation protocols provide for seventy-
seven individual allegations of negligence, which may be grouped into twelve
larger categories: (1) diagnosis; (2) anesthesia; (3) surgery; (4) medication
selection; (5) medication administration; (6) intravenous procedures; (7)
obstetrics; (8) treatment; (9) patient monitoring; (10) biomedical equipment;
(11) blood products; and (12) other allegations not elsewhere classified.
Severity of injury was classified according to the nine-level system
developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 4
1. US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed in 1984 (April 1987).
2. US Dep't of Health and Human Services, Health Care Fin Admin, ICD-9-CM: International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (1980).
3. See Harvard Risk Management Foundation, Risk Management Foundation Information System
(1987).
4. Nat'l Ass'n Ins Commissioners, Medical Malpractice Closed Claims, 1975-1978 (1980). For a
listing of the nine categories of injury, see note 94 in main text.
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